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AFDC for the Unborn
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past year, the scope of the federal statute' authoriz-
ing the Aid to Families with Dependent Children ("AFDC") pro-
gram has been expanded, not by legislative amendment, but by ju-
dicial interpretation in a series of federal decisions holding that
states cannot deny AFDC assistance to unborn children.2  Four
courts of appeals and ten federal district courts have so held,3
and two other district courts have issued preliminary injunctions to
prevent state welfare departments from denying aid to the unborn.4
There is, however, a division of authority concerning this issue,
since four federal district courts have held that states, at their op-
tion, may refuse to grant AFDC payments for the unborn.5
The principal issue in these cases is one of statutory interpreta-
tion-whether the Social Security Act requires aid for unborn chil-
dren.8 Part II of this Comment will deal with how several courts
have resolved this problem against the background of previous
United States Supreme Court decisions which have construed the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1970).
2. Carver v. Hooker, 43 U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July 18, 1974), aff'g 369
F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973); Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.
1974), af 'g 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Doe v. Lukhard, 493
F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), affg 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973); Wisdom
v. Norton, 372 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Conn. 1974); Green v. Stanton, 364
F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Harris v. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub.
Welfare, 363 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Miss. 1973); Stuart v. Canary, 367 F.
Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798 (D.
Mass. 1973); Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
3. Id.
4. Tapia v. Vowell, Civ. No. 73-B-169 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 1973); Tillman
v. Endsley, No. 73-1476-Civ.-CF (S.D. Fla. Oct. 1, 1973).
5. Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Poole v. Endsley,
371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974); Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51
(M.D. Fla. 1974); Murrow v. Clifford, Civ. No. 114-73 (D.N.J. June 12,
1973).
6. The issue is centered around the interpretation df the words "depend-
ent child" as used throughout the statute, especially in 42 U.S.C. § 606
(a) (1964). No specific reference to the unborn is ever made in the
law.
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federal AFDC statute.7 In Part III, the administrative and philo-
sophical ramifications of these decisions will be discussed. Admini-
strative questions like the following must be answered: How are
the states to finance the increased AFDC payments, if they are re-
quired? Is the unborn child to receive the same payment as a "born"
child? What happens in the case of multiple births? What is the
significance of a terminated pregnancy? The philosophical difficul-
ties in this area arise primarily out of the last question. As a re-
sult of the landmark decision in Roe v. Wade s American women
presently possess greater legal freedom over the control of preg-
nancy termination than they have ever known. Despite judicial
verbiage to the contrary, the decision to require AFDC for the
unborn may be the first step toward curtailing that freedom.9 Fi-
nally, Part IV will attempt to identify the probable trend in this
area and to delineate a possible solution to the conflict through a
balancing of the welfare recipient's need for AFDC for an unborn
child against the need of all women for constitutionally sanctioned
control over the termination of unwanted pregnancies.
I. THE CASES
A. Mandatory AFDC for the Unborn
Ten courts of appeals and four federal district courts have held
that states cannot deny AFDC benefits to the unborn.10 The fac-
tual background in all the cases was virtually identical. The plain-
tiffs were pregnant women who were in all ways eligible for
AFDC except that their children had not yet been born. Since the
state in each instance had no program providing aid for the un-
born," the plaintiffs had been denied AFDC benefits until the birth
7. New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973);
Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406
U.S. 535 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971); Dandridge
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. In Alcala v. Burns, 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973), afj'd, 494 F.2d
743 (8th Cir. 1974), the court noted that "the fact that a child is not
protected as a person under the United States constitution is not rele-
vant to the ... [present] inquiry." Id. at 186. The court's reasoning
fails to resolve the fundamental conflict, as will be shown subse-
quently.
10. See note 2 supra.
11. The New Hampshire welfare program, as noted in Carver v. Hooker,
369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July
18, 1974), differs slightly from the others discussed in this Comment.
New Hampshire, though denying AFDC benefits to pregnant women
who have no other children, will pay for the prenatal care of an other-
wise eligible pregnant woman if the woman already has a "born" child
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of their children. Each of the cases was brought as a class action1 2
representing (1) all women whose pregnancies had been medically
determined and who met the eligibility requirements for AFDC but
were denied benefits until their children were born and (2) their
unborn children.' 3 The plaintiffs sought injunctions restraining
or children receiving AFDC benefits. See Carver v. Hooker, id., at 209.
This difference is not particularly significant for the purposes of this
Comment, and the Carver case will be discussed without further ref-
erence to the unusual and seemingly inexplicable distinction made by
the New Hampshire Public Welfare Department between those preg-
nant women without other children and those with other children.
12. The plaintiffs in Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. III. 1973),
affd, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974), were given leave to pro-
ceed as a class, and since this was the first of these cases to be decided,
the other courts, in general, followed the Wilson court's reasoning.
In Wilson it was noted that a class action was necessary to enable the
class members to secure the full relief to which they were entitled.
Plaintiffs were seeking payment of all AFDC benefits wrongfully de-
nied and withheld as a result of the state policy toward the unborn.
The court held, inter ala, that the class members were entitled to res-
titution of benefits unlawfully withheld. Id. at 1152. This reasoning,
however, is no longer valid in light of the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974), that the
eleventh amendment barred the federal courts from awarding welfare
benefits retroactively. See note 14 infra. This leaves open the ques-
tion of whether plaintiffs could now proceed as a class on some other
rationale, and limits, as a practical matter, the usefulness of class ac-
tions in this situation.
13. See Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. l. 1973), af'd, 42
U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974). The fact that in some instances
the plaintiffs' children were born before the cases were decided was
not a bar to the actions. The court in Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp.
204 (D.N.H. 1973) affd, 43 U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July 18, 1974), con-
sidered the argument that the birth of plaintiffs' children rendered the
action moot and disposed of it in a brief footnote. Id. at 218 n.50. Doe
v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d 54 (4th
Cir. 1974), also held that the plaintiff's claims would not be mooted
by the birth of her child. Both courts supported their conclusions by
using the Supreme Court's reasoning in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113(1973), that the short gestation period of pregnancy should not un-justly prevent prosecution of a claim otherwise capable of repetition.
Because of the time presently required to prosecute a claim in a fed-
eral district court, this seems to be the only logical solution to the
problem. Otherwise, as the court appropriately observed in Green v.
Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123, 127 (N.D. Ind. 1973), afl'd sub nom., Wilson
v. Weaver, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974), the plaintiffs
would "receive nothing as a result of this decision." Additionally, the
Lukhard court used the plaintiff's claim for past benefits to support
its holding that the case was not moot. Doe v. Lukhard, supra at 826.
This argument is no longer valid because of the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974), that the eleventh
amendment barred federal courts from awarding welfare benefits ret-
roactively. See note 14 infra. This, however, would not require that
584 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 4 (1974)
the states from further denying AFDC benefits for their unborn
children, and declaratory judgments determining the states' prac-
tice to be illegal.14
a court hold plaintiffs' claims moot after the birth of their children as
the short gestation period rationale of Wade remains viable.
Mootness was also raised as an issue in Jones v. Graham, Civ. No.
73-L-235 (D. Neb. April 5, 1974). After the suit was filed, the Ne-
braska Department of Public Welfare promulgated new regulations
providing the same benefits for unborn as for born children. The
court concluded that the Department's assurance that the regulations
were permanent was reliable. Because Edelman v. Jordan supra, pre-
cluded an award of retroactive payments accruing prior to the new
regulations, the court held the issues presented in the plaintiffs' com-
plaint moot and dismissed the case. It is not known what assurances
the Department of Public Welfare provided the court to convince it of
the permanency of the new regulations. One can only speculate on
the court's reaction should the Department rescind these regulations in
the future.
14. In addition to declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiffs in a sig-
nificant number of these cases also sought the payment of benefits
which they alleged had been wrongfully withheld by the states.
Carver v. Hooker, 43 U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July 18, 1974), affg 369
F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973); Wilson v. Weaver, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th
Cir. May 9, 1974), aff'g 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973) and Green
v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Alcala v. Burns, 494 F.2d
743 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'g 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Whitfield
v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1973); Stuart v. Canary, 367 F.
Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973). Subsequently the United States Su-
preme Court in Edelman v. Jordan, 94 S. Ct. 1347 (1974), held that the
eleventh amendment barred federal courts from ordering payments or
awarding welfare benefits retroactively. For a discussion of the im-
pact of this holding on the issue of mootness and the use of class ac-
tions, see notes 12 and 13 supra. The Court found that Illinois officials
administering the programs of Aid to the Aged, Blind and Disabled
("AABD"), which like the AFDC programs are funded by the state
and federal governments, had violated federal law by following state
regulations that did not comply with federal standards. The Supreme
Court held, however, that the judgment could be given a prospective
effect only because ordering retroactive payments would amount to an
award of damages against the state and was therefore barred by the
eleventh amendment. The Court noted that although the amendment,
by its terms, did not bar suits against a state by one of its own citi-
zens, that it had consistently held an unconsenting state immune from
suits brought against it in federal courts by its own citizens as well
as by citizens of another state.
Even before Edelman v. Jordan, supra, most of the AFDC cases
considering this issue had reached similar results. The court in Alcala
v. Burns, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'g 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa
1973), used an eleventh amendment rationale like that in Edelman to
deny an award of retroactive benefits. Other courts reasoned that the
basic policy underlying the Social Security Act in this situation was
remedial, and that its goal of affording prenatal care to the disadvan-
taged would not be furthered by a retroactive award of compensatory
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1. Need for AFDC
The plaintiffs in the unborn children cases based a portion of
their claims on their need for AFDC payments, both for themselves
and their unborn children. The courts were responsive. One court
commented upon "the serious consequences that flow to the family
if the nutritional and medical needs of the child are not met during
this prenatal period,"'1 while another noted the "serious and last-
ing" consequences which may result from inadequate care and nu-
trition during the prenatal period.'0 The courts in both Stuart v.
Canary17 and Carver v. Hooker'8 discussed at some length the ad-
verse effects of improper prenatal diet and medical care, noting es-
pecially the lower birthweight of infants born under these condi-
tions. The Carver court found:
[P]renatal nutrition, and to a lesser extent, prenatal medical care,
is a major determinant of infant birthweight, which is in turn di-
rectly related to later susceptibility to disease, neurological prob-
lems and long-term learning capacity. Dr. Jacobsen [expert wit-
ness in the field of maternal and infant nutrition] further testified
that, absent AFDC benefits, it was "highly unlikely" that a mother
could be assured of an adequate nutritional intake based on the
State food allowances available to pregnant women.' 9
The Stuart court concluded, from evidence similar to that discussed
in the Carver case, that
[i]f adequate fetal nutrition can alleviate in any degree potential
damages, particularly where the state had not acted in bad faith in de-
nying AFDC. Carver v. Hooker, 43 U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July 18,
1974), aff'g 369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973); Whitfield v. Minter, 368
F. Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1973); Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D.
Ohio 1973).
Two district courts did order the retroactive payment of AFDC
benefits. Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (bene-
fits awarded retroactively to all class members as well as to named
plaintiffs); Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (bene-
fits awarded retroactively only to named plaintiffs). The portion of
both these cases granting retroactive benefits was subsequently re-
versed, Wilson v. Weaver, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974), afi'g
358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. MI1. 1973) and Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp.
123 (N.D. Ind. 1973), following the Supreme Court's decision in Edel-
man v. Jordan, supra.
15. Alcala v. Burns, 362 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d
743 (8th Cir. 1974).
16. Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123, 126 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd sub nom.,
Wilson v. Weaver, 42 U.S.I.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974), citing
Birch, Functional Effects of Fetal Malnutrition, Hosp. PRAc. 134 (1971).
17. 367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
18. 369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July
18, 1974).
19. Id. at 208.
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burdens upon the State toward the goal of familial betterment, in-
clusion of the unborn as eligible for AFDC coverage is indicated
by the intent of Congress in implementing the Social Security
Act. 20
Thus, these courts reasoned, AFDC for the unborn child is consistent
with the purposes of the Social Security Act as set out in section
601 of Title 42 of the United States Code:
For the purposes of encouraging the care of dependent children
in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each
State to furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation and other
services, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to
needy dependent children and the parents or relatives with whom
they are living to help maintain and strengthen family life and to
help such parents or relatives to attain or retain capability for the
maximum self-support and personal independence consistent with
the maintenance of continuing parental care and protection, there
is authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum suffi-
cient to carry out the purposes of this part.
As expressed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit,21 the paramount goal of AFDC is the protection of needy
children and "[the providing of benefits to unborn needy children
fully implements that goal.22
This rationale posits a need for sufficient and proper food and
complete medical care during the prenatal period and is reinforced
by the consequences of infant and maternal deaths, permanent
neurological disorders and mental retardation which can result
from inadequate care and nutrition prior to the birth of the child.
While it can, of course, be argued that prevention of such difficul-
ties is within the contemplated purposes of section 601, it seems
abundantly clear that this sort of reasoning anticipates benefits to
'both the mother and the unborn child. The child is, without ques-
tion, regarded as a "person" in those instances and this may cause,
in part, the conflicts with the decision in Roe v. Wade.23 This as-
pect of the problem will be discussed more fully in Part III.
2. Statutory Interpretation
The ultimate inquiry in this area is whether the Social Security
Act requires aid for the unborn. The AFDC program is jointly fi-
nanced by the states and the federal government and administered
by the individual states or by political subdivisions within the state
under state supervision. Each state has the option of participating
20. Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343, 1346 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
21. Wilson v. Weaver, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974).
22. Id.
23. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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in the program. Those states choosing to participate submit a plan
of administration to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare. If the plan meets the requirements of the Social Security Act,
it is approved, and the federal government provides matching
grants-in-aid to the state within the limits of the Act's provisions
specifying the scope of federal financial participation.
The requirements for obtaining federal approval of a state
AFDC plan are contained in section 602 of Title 42 of the United
States Code (hereinafter "section 602"). Sections 606, 607 and 608
define the class of persons in whose behalf the state may receive
federal matching funds under the AFDC program. Section 602 (b)
provides that the Secretary "shall approve" any plan which fulfills
the conditions specified in section 602 (a). One of those conditions
is that AFDC "shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all
eligible individuals. ' 24 Under this requirement, a state plan may
not contain an "eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible
for assistance under federal AFDC standards. 25
The supremacy clause of the Constitution requires that any con-
flict between state law or policy and federal law must be resolved
in favor of the federal law. Whether the unborn constitute "eligi-
'ble individuals" who thus may not be excluded from the AFDC
program under Section 602 (a) (10) of the Social Security Act the
issue which must be resolved.
The interpretation of the words "dependent child" in section
606(a) of Title 42 of the United States Code 26 (hereinafter "section
606(a)") is central to the resolution of that issue. Although it does
not appear on the face of the statute that this phrase would, neces-
24. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (10) (1964).
25. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971). This discussion of the
general nature of the AFDC program is taken from the Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598
(1972).
26. When used in this part-
(a) The term "dependent child" means a needy child (1)
who has been deprived of parental support or care by reason
of the death, continued absence from the home, or physical or
mental incapacity of a parent, and who is living with his fa-
ther, mother, grandfather, grandmother, brother, sister, stepfa-
ther, stepmother, stepbrother, stepsister, uncle, aunt, first
cousin, nephew, or niece, in a place of residence maintained
by one or more of such relatives as his or their own home, and(2) who is (A) under the age of eighteen, or (B) under the
age of twenty-one and (as determined by the State in accord-
ance with standards prescribed by the Secretary) a student
regularly attending a school, college, or university, or regu-
larly attending a vocational or technical training designed to
fit him for gainful employment;
42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
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sarily, include the unborn, many courts have reached that result.
This interpretation is based on several sources: dictionary defini-
tions, legislative history, and guidelines previously enunciated by
the Supreme Court for determining eligibility for AFDC.2 7
First, it is noted that as a general rule words used in a statute
are to be given their usual and commonly understood meaning. The
courts have recited the dictionary definition of "child" which is "an
unborn or recently born human being. '28 From this, one of the
courts concluded directly that this was the meaning intended by
Congress to be given to the word "child" in section 606 (a) ;29 another
determined that at least there is no evidence of congressional intent
to exclude the unborn;3 0 while a third, more realistically, observed
that "the 'plain language' of the statute is not as plain as both par-
ties contend and is surely not conclusive for the plaintiffs or the de-
fendants."1
Having determined that the language of the Social Security Act
was inconclusive, some courts looked to the Act's legislative history
in an attempt to find a clearer manifestation of congressional intent.
Those which explored this question in depth32 reached identical
conclusions: although legislative history contemporaneous with the
original Social Security Act is inconclusive, the last Congress recog-
nized the prevailing interpretation of section 606(a) as including
the unborn. Both houses of the Ninety-Second Congress proposed
amendments which would have prohibited AFDC payments on be-
half of the unborn.3 3 These amendments, however, were not
27. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
28. WEBSTER'S NEW INT'L DICTIoNARY 388 (3d ed. 1969).
29. Harris v. Mississippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 363 F. Supp. 1293
(N.D. Miss. 1973).
30. Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd sub nom.,
Wilson v. Weaver, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974). See also
Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973), alf'd, 42 U.S.L.W.
2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974).
31. Alcala v. Burns, 362 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d
743 (8th Cir. 1974).
32. Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 42 U.S.L.W.
2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974); Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D.
Va. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974).
33. The House Ways and Means Committee in H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. at 184 (1971), states:
"Your committee wants to make clear that an unborn child
would not be included in the definition of a child. This will
preclude the practice, now used in the AFDC program in
some states, of finding that an unborn child does meet the
definition, thereby establishing a "family" even before the
child is born."
And, the Senate Finance Committee Report, S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong.,
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passed.34 From this recognition by Congress of the present policy
of the federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare (here-
inafter "HEW") permitting AFDC payments for the unborn where
the states so desire,3 5 and from congressional refusal to pass an
amendment prohibiting this practice, the courts concluded that Con-
gress had determined unborn children to be "presently entitled to
AFDC benefits."3 6
Since 1941, HEW has allowed the states to include the unborn
among those receiving AFDC benefits, but has not required their
inclusion. The HEW regulation which permits this states only that
"[f] ederal financial participation is available in: ... (ii) payments
with respect to an unborn child when the fact of pregnancy has
been determined by medical diagnosis. T37 That these benefits are
optional is not clearly evident from the regulation, but they have
been so interpreted by HEW and by the courts, and HEW has con-
sistently approved state programs with and without provisions for
payments to the unborn.3 8
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
placed great weight on HEW's long-standing administrative inter-
pretation that an unborn child constitutes a "dependent child"
within the contemplation of the Social Security Act.39 The court
noted that the action of the Ninety-Second Congress was an attempt
to exclude the unborn from the coverage of the Act which failed,
leaving intact HEW's interpretation that the unborn are to be in-
cluded in the AFDC program. This court, however, did not discuss
the fact that under HEW's regulations the inclusion of the unborn
2d Sess. at 108 (1972), states: "Regulations of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare permit Aid to Families with Depend-
ent Children payments for a child who has not yet been born. The
committee bill would make unborn children ineligible for AFDC."
34. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329.
35. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c) (2) (ii) (1973).
36. Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 42
U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974).
37. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (c) (2) (1973).
38. The policy allowing payments to the unborn originated in Wisconsin
which paid these benefits under its 1931 state program which had been
in effect prior to the enactment of the federal program. Wisconsin was
permitted to include the unborn under its implementation of the fed-
eral AFDC program by a ruling of the federal Social Security Board
in 1941. Since 1946, assistance for the unborn has been allowed as an-
nounced in HEW's Handbook of Public Assistance Administration, and
in 1971 the practice of including the unborn in the AFDC program was
expressed in HEW's formal regulations for the first time. It has been
noted that of the 7,000,000 children receiving AFDC in January, 1971,
53,400 were unborn. S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 467 (1972).
39. Wilson v. Weaver, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974).
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has never been required, but is optional with each state. Thus, an
equally viable interpretation of the congressional action appears to
be that Congress is satisfied with the optional program promulgated
by HEW, and will continue to permit, but not require, AFDC for
the unborn. None of the courts involved, however, rested their de-
cision entirely on this reasoning.
Instead, the courts have turned to prior judicial interpretations
of this portion of the Social Security Act. From a trilogy of cases,
King v. Smith,40 Townsend v. Swank,4 1 and Carleson v. Remillard,42
three principles have been enunciated (as set out in Alcala v.
Burns43):
(1) The states may not impose more restrictive eligibility condi-
tions for receiving AFDC than those set out in the Social Security
Act;
(2) In order to exclude an applicant who would have been covered
under the Social Security Act, the state must rely on legislative
history or statutory language "clearly evidencing" Congressional
intent to allow the exclusion of the applicant;
(3) HEW regulations purporting to make eligibility for certain
groups of applicants optional with the states are of no effect in the
absence of Congressional intent to allow such exclusions.
Stated otherwise, where they are inconsistent, it is the words of
the Social Security Act and not HEW's regulations which are con-
trolling, and absent a clear congressional intent to exclude the un-
born from AFDC eligibility, the states may not vary the Act's eligi-
bility requirements without violating the supremacy clause of the
Constitution. A brief discussion of the trilogy of cases which led to
this holding is appropriate.
In King v. Smith,4 4 Alabama's "substitute father" regulation 4
was held inconsistent with the definition of "parent" under section
606(a), because neither the Social Security Act nor its legislative
history justified the denial of AFDC benefits to the children of a
mother who cohabits with an able-bodied man. The Supreme Court
40. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
41. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
42. 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
43. 362 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D. Iowa 1973), affd, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir.
1974).
44. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
45. This regulation of the Alabama Department of Pensions and Security
denied AFDC payments to the children of a mother who "cohabited"
in or outside her home with any single or married able-bodied man,
reasoning that this person constituted a "substitute father" for pur-
poses of the Social Security Act.
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in King, interpreting sections 606(a) and 602(a), 46 held that the So-
cial Security Act determined eligibility standards for AFDC and that
state provisions which narrowed those standards were to that extent
invalid under the supremacy clause.
In Townsend v. Swank,47 the Supreme Court held that the states
did not have the option of denying AFDC benefits to needy depend-
ent children between the ages of 18 and 21 who attended a college or
university while granting these benefits to those who attended high
school or a vocational training school. Interpreting King, the Court
stated:
Thus King v. Smith established that, at least in the absence of Con-
gressional authorization for the exclusion clearly evidenced from
the Social Security Act or its legislative history, a state eligibility
standard that excludes persons eligible for assistance under federal
AFDC standards violates the Social Security Act and is therefore
invalid under the Supremacy Clause. We recognize that HEW reg-
ulations seem to imply that states may to some extent vary eligi-
bility requirements from federal standards. However, the principle
that accords substantial weight to interpretation of a statute by the
department entrusted with its administration is inapplicable insofar
as those regulations are inconsistent with the requirement of Sec-
tion 402 (a) (10) that aid be furnished to all eligible individuals.48
A recent application of the King-Townsend test was in Carleson
v. Remillard,49 where the Supreme Court invalidated a California
regulation which denied AFDC benefits to otherwise eligible indivi-
viduals on the basis that absence from the home for military service
did not constitute "continued absence from the home"5 0 for the
purposes of satisfying AFDC eligibility requirements. In that case,
as in King, Townsend and the unborn child cases, it was contended
that because state plans were optional, HEW had the authority to ap-
prove plans denying benefits to the children involved. However,
since neither the statute nor its legislative history clearly supported
that assertion, such coverage was held to be mandatory. 51
Thus, relying on the authority of these three cases, the courts
which considered the unborn child exclusion concluded that neither
the Social Security Act nor its legislative history clearly evidenced a
46. The relevant language of this section provides: "A State plan ...
must ... (10) provide ... that aid to families with dependent chil-
dren shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible in-
dividuals."
47. 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
48. 404 U.S. 282, 286 (1971) (emphasis in original).
49. 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a) (1970).
51. See Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973), afi'd, 42
U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974).
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congressional authorization for excluding unborn children from eli-
gibility for AFDC under the definition of "dependent child." One
court emphatically observed that "the Social Security Act and its
legislative history are -barren of any clear congressional authoriza-
tion to exclude unborn children from participating in the AFDC
program. '52 Unborn children were therefore held to be eligible for
AFDC benefits under section 606(a) and "the state cannot at its
option choose to disregard same. ' 5 3 The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit in Alcala v. Burns54 accurately and succinctly sum-
marized this line of reason, noting:
We believe that the district court correctly concluded that the term
"dependent child" is broad enough to emcompass an unborn child
and that such coverage is consistent with the purposes of the Social
Security Act. The King, Townsend and Remillard cases, then, de-
termine that defendants' interpretation of the welfare manual,
denying benefits to unborn children and their mothers, violates the
Supremacy Clause and is invalid.55
B. Optional AFDC for the Unborn
Four courts have reached results contrary to those discussed
above.56 These courts, while recognizing that AFDC payments to
the unborn are not inconsistent with the purposes of the federal
act,57 have nonetheless held that section 606(a) does not require
states participating in the AFDC program to make such payments.
The court in Parks v. Harden58 was the first to hold the payment
of these benefits optional. Although it agreed that eligibility for
AFDC must be measured by federal and not state standards, the
court found it anomalous to rely, as other courts had done, on
HEW's interpretation of eligibility but to reject HEW's recognition
of the optional nature of the program.59
As previously noted, however, "The Parks opinion did not ex-
52. Wilson v. Weaver, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974).
53. Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd, 493 F.2d
54 (4th Cir. 1974).
54. 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), affg 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
55. Id. at 746.
56. Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Poole v. Endsley,
371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974); Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51(M.D. Fla. 1974); Murrow v. Clifford, Civ. No. 114-73 (D.N.J. June 12,
1974).
57. "There can be no question that, in terms of need and dependency,
many unborn children are in far more severe circumstances than born
children," Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 622 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
58. 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
59. See also Doe v. Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823, 828 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd,
493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
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plain from where the authority for a so-called optional program was
derived if such coverage was not contemplated by the Social Secur-
ity Act."60 And, if coverage was contemplated within the Act, it
would appear that the states could not vary the coverage under the
rule of King, Townsend, and Carleson cases. The Parks court, how-
ever, concluded that "mere inclusion in the regulations does not in
itself require the payment of benefits. That states still have latitude
in their choice of programs is evident."6 1 Dandridge v. Williams6 +2
and Jefferson v. Hackney,63 were cited as authority for this proposi-
tion.
In the Dandridge case, the Supreme Court held that a Maryland
maximum grant regulation placing an absolute limit on the amount
of an AFDC grant regardless of the size of a family and its actual
need, was not in conflict with section 602(a) (10) which requires
that aid be furnished to "all eligible individuals." The plaintiffs
contended that the maximum grant policy deprived the youngest
children in a large family of any aid, but the court concluded that
the result of the regulation was not to deprive anyone of benefits
but to reduce the amount of benefits given to each recipient. Thus,
King v. Smith64 was distinguished on the basis that no "eligible indi-
viduals" were being denied benefits in Dandridge. The court
noted:
The appellees rely most heavily upon the statutory requirement
that aid "shall be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eli-
gible individuals.
But since the statute leaves the level of benefits within the judg-
ment of the State, this language cannot mean that the "aid" fur-
nished must equal the total of each individual's standard of need
in every family group.6 5
It was also stated that "[a]s long as some aid is provided to all
eligible families and all eligible children, the statute itself is not
violated." 66
The Supreme Court in the Jefferson case held that the system
employed by Texas to allocate its fixed pool of welfare money
60. Alcala v. Burns, 362 F. Supp. 180, 185-86 (S.D. Iowa 1973), afi'd, 494
F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974).
61. Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 623 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
62. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
63. 406 U.S. 535 (1972). The Parks court also referred to Townsend v.
Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971), and Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598(1972), in support of its conclusion, although the reason for their inclu-
sion is unclear since these cases do not stand for the proposition for
which they were cited.
64. 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
65. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 480 (1970).
66. Id. at 481.
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among persons with acknowledged need did not violate the Social
Security Act. Texas had reduced the standard of need for AFDC by
a greater percentage than for other assistance programs. The King
and Townsend cases were again distinguished, relying on the lan-
guage in King that
States have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC re-
sources, since each State is free to set its own standard of need and
to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes
to the program. 67
The Court determined that section 602 (a) (10), which requires that
benefits be furnished to "all eligible individuals," was not violated
by the Texas scheme. The statute was intended, the Court observed,
to prevent states from denying benefits to qualified individuals and
from creating certain exceptions to standards specifically enunci-
ated in the federal Act. Section 602 (a) (10) did not, however, "enact
by implication a generalized federal criterion to which States must
adhere in their computation of standards of need, income, and bene-
fits.6 8
From an examination of Dandridge and Jefferson, it appears that
the reliance by the Parks court on their holdings is misplaced.
These cases did not involve the exclusion of an identifiable group
of eligible individuals from the AFDC program but only the methods
used by the states ta allocate available state resources among AFDC
recipients. In Dandridge and Jefferson it was the amount of AFDC
grants which was being called into question, while in King, Town-
send and Carelson, and in those cases involving AFDC for the un-
born, it was the classification of persons eligible for AFDC which
was at issue.
The court in Parks admitted that if the phrase "dependent child"
in section 606 (a) necessarily included the unborn child, King, Town-
send and Carleson would require the rejection of state plans which
omit aid for the unborn since such omissions would clearly conflict
with the statute itself. Therefore, Parks, like the other courts which
considered this issue, looked to the federal statute and its legislative
history in an attempt to ascertain the Congressional intent con-
cerning unborn children and the AFDC program. Unlike the other
courts, however, the Parks opinion looked for the specific inclusion
of the unborn in the definition of "dependent child" rather than for
its specific exclusion. The court concluded: "There is no .basis in
the statute itself nor in the legislative history to conclude that an
unborn child is included in the definition of 'dependent child.' "69
67. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968).
68. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 545 (1972).
69. Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 625 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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The Parks court determined that incusion of the unborn in the
payment of AFDC benefits was not required by decisions of the Su-
preme Court, by legislative intent, or by the administrative practices
of HEW. It seems apparent that the court failed to apply correctly
the eligibility test delineated in the Supreme Court trilogy.70 Spe-
cific exclusion by Congress of a particular group, and not specific in-
clusion, would seem to be the proper test.
The other three courts which held AFDC payments for the un-
born to be optional, but not mandatory,7 1 reached results like that
in the Parks case, using substantially similar, though not identical
reasoning. Echoing the "specific inclusion" test of the Parks court,
for example, the court in Poole v. Endsley72 was unable to find any
congressional intent to prescribe AFDC benefits for the unborn.7 3
The court inquired rhetorically:
Can it be said that Congress at the time that this legislation was
enacted in the year 1938, intended to provide benefits in the Act
for an undeveloped fetus in the early months of pregnancy? The
answer is obvious.74
If it were indeed "obvious" that Congress in its 1936 enactment of
the AFDC program had intended to exclude the unborn, then such
an intent would require their continued exclusion under the Su-
preme Court's interpretation of the King, Townsend and Carleson
cases. There is, however, no real evidence of such an intent and,
in fact, it appears likely that the 1936 Congress gave no considera-
tion to the unborn with respect to the AFDC program. Thus, absent
an intent to exclude, under the trilogy holdings, there is no need to
find an intent to include. The unborn must be held to be eligible
for benefits under the program unless specifically excluded or un-
less the unborn child cases can be validly distinguished from the
King-Townsend-Carleson triad.
An attempt to draw such a distinction was made in Mixon v.
Keller.7 15 According to this case, the language of the Social Security
Act 76 itself appeared to exclude fetuses, because "[i]t is obviously
impossible to encourage the care of a fetus in the home of a relative
70. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
71. Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Fla. 1974); Mixon v. Keller,
372 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Murrow v. Clifford, Civ. No. 114-
73 (D.N.J. June 12, 1974).
72. 371 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (N.D. Fla. 1974).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 372 F. Supp. 51 (MD. Fla. 1974).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
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other than the mother." 77 The court noted that fetuses are, accord-
ing to expert testimony, never referred to medically or clinically as
"children" and further observed that "child" does not mean fetus in
normal conversational usage.78 Thus, the court concluded that
those members of Congress responsible for the drafting and passage
of this legislation were not so naive, unversed or short-sighted in
medical terminology to ignore or omit the term "fetus" where it
is alleged they specifically intended to include the same. Such an
omission from Title IV could only be intentional when one ex-
amines Title V of the Social Security Act where Congress specifi-
cally includes mention of pre-natal care and prospective mother-
hood and child-bearing.79
Having shown to to its own satisfaction that the unborn were
excluded from the terms of the Act, the Mixon court demonstrated
that the Supreme Court trilogy"0 could be distinguished from the
question involving AFDC for the unborn. These three cases, the
court noted, dealt with fact situations in which a state had excluded
individuals specifically included in the plain language of the Social
Security Act.8 ' Since in the instant case the unborn were excluded,
the court reasoned that the state's action in denying the unborn
AFDC benefits did not constitute the imposition of an additional eli-
gibility requirement excluding individuals from AFDC benefits
whom the Social Security Act had "expressly provided 81 2 would be
eligible. Therefore, the court held, the King-Townsend-Carleson
trilogy did not require that AFDC for the unborn be a mandatory
part of the AFDC program.
This logic, while it may be superficially appealing, fails upon
closer examination. The Mixon court merely eliminated the problem
by defining its terms in such a way that the phrase "dependent
child" in the Social Security Act 83 was deemed to exclude the un-
born. This, of course, is the crux of the matter. The central issue in
all of these cases is precisely whether the unborn are considered to
be dependent children. The language of the act does not clearly
exclude the unborn, despite the holding to the contrary in Mixon
v. Keller.8 4 And, absent this specific exclusion by Congress, it
77. Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 54 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
81. Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 55 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
82. Id. at 56.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 606 (a) (1970). See note 53 supra, for the text of this sec-
tion.
§4, 372 F. Supp. 51 (M.D. Fla. 1974),
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would appear that the Supreme Court trilogy requires mandatory
AFDC payments for the unborn.
The Mixon court, however, rejected the specific exclusion theory,
stating that "[t]his construction does violence to the actual intent
expressed by the Supreme Court in the... [trilogy] cases."8 5 Quot-
ing from the Supreme Court's discussion of the King-Townsend-
Carleson trilogy in New York State Department of Social Services v.
Dublino,8 6 the court observed:
In [the trilogy] cases it was clear that state law excluded people
from AFDC benefits whom the Social Security Act expressly pro-
vided would be eligible. The [Supreme] Court found no room
either in the Act's language or legislative history to warrant the
state's additional eligibility requirements.8 7
The Mixon court apparently believed that, unlike the terms "par-
ent" in King and "continued absence from the home" in Carleson,
the meaning of "dependent child" was unclear, that it did not neces-
sarily include unborn children, and that therefore it should not be so
construed. Since the statutory phrase did not definitely include the
unborn, the court felt that Congress intended the states to have dis-
cretion in determining whether to extend AFDC to the unborn.
The court concluded that it was consistent with the Supreme Court's
most recent construction of the "triad" in Dublino to hold that, ab-
sent an express provision in the federal act including the unborn,
they need not be covered by the state. However, this identical argu-
ment was unsuccessfully raised by the United States in its amicus
brief in Carleson.88 The Supreme Court disregarded the argument
there and the Mixon court would have been well-advised to do the
same. This line of reasoning amounts to a reversal of the trilogy test
of eligibility and would authorize states to exclude persons from
AFDC unless the statute or its legislative history clearly made cover-
age mandatory.8 9
85. Id. at 55.
86. 413 U.S. 405 (1973).
87. Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. 51, 56 (M.D. Fla. 1974) (emphasis
original), citing New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 421 (1973).
88. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 5-7, Carleson v. Remillard,
406 U.S. 598 (1972). In its brief the government argued that the
phrase "continued absence" in the Social Security Act did not ex-
pressly provide for the inclusion of those persons absent from the
home for military service. The government reasoned that because
Congress had failed to define the federal standard applicable to this
aspect of AFDC eligibility the states were intended to have consider-
able latitude in determining what sort of parental absence justified
AFDC assistance.
89. Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affd, 42
U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974), rejected this "reversal" of the
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The Mixon, court argued that Dublino weakened the plaintiffs'
reliance on the trilogy. Despite the language from Dublino quoted
above, however, that case does not appear to be a retreat from the
Supreme Court's position in King, Townsend, and Carleson. Dub-
lino considered the Work Incentive Program ("WIN") of the Social
Security Act9", which provided that certain "employable" individ-
uals, as a condition for receiving welfare benefits, must register for
manpower services, training and employment. The WIN programs
were to be established only in those states and political subdivisions
[iJn which [the Secretary of Labor] determines there is a signifi-
cant number of individuals who have attained age 16 and are re-
ceiving aid to families with dependent children. In other political
subdivisions, he shall use his best efforts to provide such programs
either within such subdivisions or through the provision of trans-
portation for such persons to political subdivisions of the State in
which such programs are established. 91
The issue in Dublino was whether the WIN program pre-empted
those provisions of the New York Social Welfare Law known as the
New York Work Rules. While New York had implemented the
WIN program in 14 of its 64 social service districts, the state had
also continued to make use of its own work program under the New
York Work Rules. Under the Work Rules, welfare recipients, in
order to continue receiving aid, were required to meet certain con-
ditions not imposed on them under the WIN program, for example,
reporting every two weeks to pick up asssistance checks in person
and filing every two weeks a certificate from the appropriate public
employment office stating that no suitable employment opportuni-
ties were available.92
The Supreme Court found that WIN stopped short of providing
adequate job and training opportunities for large numbers of AFDC
recipients. Thus, the court held that the WIN program was not de-
signed to pre-empt all supplementary state work programs whose
provisions were not in actual conflict with the Social Security Act.
This, however, was the extent of the court's holding. It did not,
as the Mixon court suggested, reject the King-Townsend-Carleson
Supreme Court's eligibility test. The Wilson court, however, did not
discuss the Dublino case.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 630 et seq. (1964).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 632(a) (1964).
92. N.Y. SocIAL SERVS. LAW § 131 (McKinney Supp. 1973). Other condi-
tions imposed included requirements that welfare recipients report for
requested employment interviews, report to the public employment of-
fice the result of a referral for employment, and not fail willfully to
report for suitable employment when available. N.Y. SOCIAL S.RVS.
LAw § 131(4) (a-d) (McKinney Supp. 1973).
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test. In fact, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district
court for a determination as to which, if any, provisions of the New
York Work Rules conflicted with federal law. In so doing the court
reemphasized its holdings in the trilogy cases, noting: "[I]f there
is a conflict of substance as to eligibility provisions, the federal law
of course must control.)93
While the Mixon court's interpretation of Dublino is not entirely
without support,94 Green v. Stanton 95 and Doe v. Lukhard9" also
considered the impact of Dublino on the trilogy holdings and con-
cluded that Dublino had not altered the King-Townsend-Carleson
test of eligibility. These courts reasoned that, unlike Dublino, the
AFDC for the unborn cases do not involve questions of pre-emp-
tion.9 7 Rather, they consider the exclusion of the class of unborn
children from eligibility for AFDC, which constitutes a "conflict of
substance" with the federal requirement that aid be furnished to
"all eligible individuals." Although the Supreme Court will need
to clarify the Dublino case before its impact can be fully deter-
mined, 98 the distinction drawn by the Green and Doe courts seems
valid at present. Thus, the conclusion in Mixon that Dublino has
eliminated the "specific exclusion" test appears to be incorrect.
III. RAMIFICATIONS
A. Administrative
Numerous technical difficulties remain to be resolved in those
jurisdictions holding AFDC benefits for the unborn to be mandatory.
93. New York Dep't of Social Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 423 n.29
(1973).
94. For a discussion of Dublino and its interpretation in subsequent cases,
see Note, AFDC Eligibility Conditions Unrelated to Need: The Im-
pact of Dublino, 49 IND. L.J. 334 (1974).
95. 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd sub nom., Wilson v. Weaver,
42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974).
96. 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973), affd, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974).
97. It should be noted that the term "pre-emption" is not used in its usual
sense here since the New York rules were adopted as part of the state's
participation in the federal program. Ordinarily, "the pre-emption
question is whether a federal statute precludes the enactment of inde-
pendent state legislation dealing with the same area." Note, AFDC
Eligibility Conditions Unrelated to Need: The Impact of Dublino, 49
IND. L.J. 334, 342 n.60 (1974).
98. The court in Dublino did not expressly overrule the King, Townsend
and Carleson cases, and as noted, remanded the case for further pro-
ceedings consistent with the trilogy. However, the court's statement
that the Social Security Act "expressly provided" for the inclusion of
the classes of persons excluded from AFDC benefits in King, Town-
send and Carleson is a confusing one, since this is not the interpreta-
tion previously given to these cases.
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Of course, if it is determined by the Supreme Court that withholding
AFDC from the unborn is contrary to the federal statute, all states
will be affected. Clearly these problems can 'be solved through ad-
ministrative regulation since some states presently provide for this
sort of aid.99
At the purely practical level it will be necessary to ascertain in
each instance that "the fact of pregnancy has been determined by
medical diagnosis."' 0 0 Presumably this determination must be made
by a physician who is either employed 'by the state's welfare depart-
ment or whose services are paid for by the welfare department, since
the mothers involved are low-income individuals who would be un-
able to pay for their own medical expenses. This will mean in-
creased expenditures by the welfare departments and increased
"red tape" in processing certifications of pregnancy. This expense
has been foreseen and provided for by an HEW regulation which
states:
Federal financial participation (at the 50 percent rate) is available
in any expenses incurred in establishing eligibility for AFDC, in-
cluding expenses incident to obtaining necessary information to de-
termine the. . . pregnancy of a mother.' 0 '
This provision was apparently placed in the regulations for the bene-
fit of those states choosing to grant AFDC to the unborn under the
"optional" program provided for in HEW's regulations. 0 2
Another minor difficulty, but one which must be considered, is
the potential problem of multiple births. 0 3 Is the woman who is
carrying twins to be allocated AFDC benefits at the level of a family
consisting of one child or two?0 4
The purpose of AFDC for the unborn is to provide for the in-
creased medical and nutritional requirements of the mother which, if
99. See S. REP. No. 1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 467 (1972). The court in
Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973) is highly critical
of HEW's failure to establish a "uniform regulatory scheme," Id. at
622, in this area.
100. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90 (c) (2) (ii) (1973). This phrase is used in each case
considered in relation to this area.
101. 45 C.F.R. § 233.90(c) (3) (1973).
102. Id. at (c) (2).
103. Figures on the frequency of multiple births vary. One source states
that twins occur once in every 83.4 births. 15 ENCYCLOPEDiA BRiTAN-
NICA 985 (1973). Another says once in every 110. A. ScmnvsD,
TWINS AND SUPERTWINS 69 (1967). Triplets occur approximately
once in every 83.42 (or 1102); quadruplets once in every 83.43 (or
1103); and so on.
104. It should be noted that the existence of a multiple conception can be
medically determined, usually by the fifth month of pregnancy. A.
SCHEINFELD, TwINs AND SUPERTWINS 37 (1967).
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neglected, can adversely affect the health of the child.10 5 While the
mother's needs in a multiple-conception pregnancy may be some-
what greater than in a single-conception pregnancy, it is not likely
that medical and nutritional requirements will 'be doubled in the
case of twins, tripled in the case of triplets, and so on. It should be
noted, however, that because of the multiple conception, there may
be some increase in the mother's nutritional needs, and increased
hazards to the mother's health may necessitate greater medical ex-
penditures. 10 6 It may, therefore, be necessary to make some allow-
ances for increased benefits in the case of a multiple conception,
though exactly how to resolve the problem is not so obvious.1 °7
Despite the fact that medical and nutritional needs do not in-
crease proportionately in a multiple birth situation, it would appear
that a state might not be able to deny equal benefits to each
fetus. If AFDC payments must be made for a fetus and it can be
medically proved that a woman is pregnant with more than one fe-
tus, it seems that a state could not refuse benefits to the additional
unborn. Each fetus would be required to be treated as a separate
"dependent child" and thus each would constitute a distinct "eligi-
ble individual" to whom benefits could not be denied.
105. See notes 15-22 supra.
106. It has often been noted that a multiple conception pregnancy presents
greater risks to both the mother and the unborn children than one in-
volving a single conception. See THE EXPECTANT MOTHER 19-20, 153-
55 (M. Alk, ed. 1967); D. LLEWELLYN-JONES, M.D., EVERYWOMAN AND
HER BODY 227-29 (1971); A. SCHENFELD, Twins m SuPERTWINs 46-47
(1967). Apparently, the most common problem encountered in a mul-
tiple pregnancy is that of premature birth which increases the danger
of infant deaths. See THE EXPECTANT MOTHER, supra at 153-55; D.
LLEwELLyN-JoNEs, supra at 229. For this reason extra rest, even hos-
pitalization, and more frequent observation by a physician are recom-
mended in the last weeks of pregnancy for the woman in a multiple
conception situation. See THE EXPECTANT MOTHER, supra at 155. One
author, a gynecologist and obstetrician, notes that, if possible, a
woman carrying more than one fetus should quit working by the 28th
week of the pregnancy. D. LLEWELLYN-JONES, supra at 229. In addi-
tion to the risks of premature birth, excess fluid retention is more
likely to occur in multiple pregnancies, and special medication and
diet are needed to prevent this. THE EXPECTANT MOTHER, supra at 154-
55. Further, health problems including toxemia, anemia and other
complications of pregnancy are also more frequently experienced in
a multiple pregnancy situation. See THE EXPECTANT MOTHER, supra at
153-55; D. LLEWELLYN-JoNEs, supra at 227-29.
107. A clearly unresponsive reply to the problem was received from an of-
ficial of the California Department of Social Welfare who simply
stated: "Common sense would lead one to believe that no distinction
could be made between single and multiple conceptions for not even
the learned medical profession can, with reasonable certainty, deter-
mine this." Letter from Michael K. Ward to P.J. Winter, January 7,
1974.
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One obviously significant factor facing the states, if AFDC for
the unborn becomes mandatory, is the cost of such a program.
One state has estimated that the total annual cost to that state of
this group's inclusion, based on a count of current infants "born
into welfare" would be 2.3 million dollars.' 08 The result of this in-
clusion would, if federal contributions are also taken into account,
reduce aid to current recipients by approximately 6.8 million dol-
lars.'0 9 As one court has noted, "[c] onsidering the already mar-
ginal level of welfare subsistence in the AFDC program, the effect
on some current recipients would indeed be damaging."" 0
In partial response to this problem, California attempted to treat
unborn children differently from "born" children, allocating for an
unborn child an amount less than the full increment for an addi-
tional person in being. Under federal and state provisions, AFDC
benefits may be reduced by the amount of nonexempt "income" or
"resources" available to the recipient.' Thus, the California State
Department of Social Welfare issued regulations which sought to
measure the value to a fetus of the "resources" furnished to it by
the mother's physical contributions. This so-called "in-kind in-
come" was deducted from the AFDC grant received for the unborn
child.
The California Supreme Court in California Welfare Rights Or-
genization v. Brian,"2 held this plan to be invalid and contrary to
the intent of state and federal law. A lower court had upheld the
plan," 3 relying heavily on the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Jefferson v. Hackney" 4 which permitted the state of Texas to
reduce the standard of need for AFDC by a greater percentage than
for other categorical assistance programs under the Social Security
Act. It was noted that "[a] discretion permitting dissimilar prac-
tices for the young and aged as in the Jefferson case is suffi-
ciently broad to permit differential treatment of the born and the
unborn."" 5 While acknowledging the mandatory inclusion of the
unborn, the court held that the administrator of the state welfare
program possessed the discretion to recognize the mother's physical
108. Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620, 622 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a) (7) (1964); 45 C.F.R. § 233.20 (a) (3) (ii) (c) (1973);
CAL. WELFARE & INST. CODE § 11450, 11008 (West 1972).
112. - Cal. 3d -, 520 P.2d 970, 113 Cal. Rptr. 154 (1974).
113. California Welfare Rights Organization v. Brian, 107 Cal. Rptr. 324
(Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
114. 406 U.S. 535 (1972).
115. California Welfare Rights Organization v. Brian, 107 Cal. Rptr. 324,
333 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
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contributions to the unborn as a form of resources or "income in
kind" and thus to increase the allowance for a family with an un-
born child by an amount less than the full increment for an addi-
tional person in being.
Rejecting this rationale, the California Supreme Court noted that
neither the federal nor the state provisions which permit the deduc-
tion of "income" or "resources" defined these terms. Nevertheless,
the court did not believe that it was probable that the state legisla-
ture in using these terms intended them to be employed to reduce
AFDC grants to unborn children. The court observed:
In essence, the additional AFDC grant is really made to the mother,
not her unborn child, for the present and future needs arising from
pregnancy. Seen in this light, it would be anomalous to hold that
the pregnancy generates "income" or "resources" of benefit to any-
one, mother or child.11 6
In the absence of federal guidelines, state policy was deemed to be
controlling, and since the applicable state statutes disclosed no in-
tent to treat the unborn differently than other children, the court
held that the "in-kind income" deductions from grants to the un-
born were contrary to state and federal law. The Brian court did
not suggest that born and unborn children must always receive
equal AFDC benefits, but only that existing California statutes did
not provide for any reduction of the grant to the unborn. Pre-
sumably, if it could be shown that the legitimate needs of a fetus
were less than those of a born child, the state could make reduced
payments to the unborn. The Supreme Court has held that "States
have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources,"117
and section 602 (a) (10) requires only that aid be furnished to "all
eligible individuals" and not that all eligible individuals be given
equal amounts.
It is interesting to note that while the California Supreme Court
held that the unborn must be treated as any other "person" for the
purposes of computing AFDC grants, it did so by viewing the grant
itself as being made, not to the unborn child, but to the mother.
This decision offers little assistance for states attempting to allo-
cate limited resources, nor does it resolve the issue of whether the
AFDC decisions will weaken Roe v. Wade,11 8 since the court re-
garded the mother and not the unborn fetus as the recipient of the
grant.
116. California Welfare Rights Organization v. Brian, - Cal. 3d -, 520 P.2d
970, 974, 113 Cal. Rptr. 154, 158 (1974).
117. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1968). See also Jefferson v. Hack-
ney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
118. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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B. The Effect on Roe v. Wade
It somehow seems anomalous that an unborn child can be both a
"person" for the purposes of AFDC benefits and yet not a "person"
within the protection of the fourteenth amendment as determined
in what is commonly referred to as "the abortion decision," Roe v.
Wade.119 Nevertheless, only two of the courts which rendered the
AFDC decisions even mentioned Wade in this context.1 20
In Alcala v. Burns,'2' the court considered the "unpersuasive
but intriguing"' 22 argument that the recognition of an unborn child
as a "dependent child" within the meaning of the Social Security
Act was in conflict with Wade. The court rejected the argument,
noting that the issue in its case was whether Congress intended to
provide AFDC benefits for a mother and her unborn child and that
"[t] he fact that a child is not protected as a person under the United
States Constitution is not relevant to . . . [this] inquiry."'123 The
court further observed that the AFDC payments in question were
made to the family, not to the unborn child itself, and that it was
the mother whose right to payments was being asserted.
It is clear, however, that the reasoning of the Alcala court is cir-
cular. While it is true that the actual payments of AFDC benefits
are made to the unborn child's family through its mother, it is
equally obvious that without the existence of the unborn child no
such payments would be available to the mother. The decisions re-
quiring AFDC benefits for the unborn child must, of necessity,
recognize that child as a being, as a person.
The effect of this recognition on the Wade opinion is not immedi-
ately apparent. In that case the right to privacy, as founded in the
fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty and in the ninth
amendment's reservation of rights to the people, was held to be
'%road enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy.' ' 2 4 The Supreme Court further deter-
mined that the word "person" as used in the fourteenth amendment
did not include the unborn,125 but recognized the state's "impor-
119. Id.
120. Alcala v. Burns, 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973), aff'd, 494 F.2d 743
(8th Cir. 1974); Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973),
aff-d, 43 U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July 18, 1974). Wilson v. Weaver,
358 F. Supp. 1147 at 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1973), af'd, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th
Cir. May 9, 1974), makes a brief, but unhelpful, mention of abortion.
121. 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973), afi'd, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974).
122. Id. at 186.
123. Id.
124. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
125. Id. at 158.
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tant and legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health
of the pregnant woman. . . and. . . in protecting the potentiality
of human life."'126 The court held that the abortion decision in the
first trimester of pregnancy must be left to the attending physi-
cian's medical judgment, but that state regulation in varying de-
grees (including proscription of abortions subsequent to viability)
during the second and third trimesters of pregnancy was permissi-
ble.
Carver v. Hooker127 approached the Wade decision in a somewhat
different manner. The court granted standing to the plaintiffs as
pregnant women, permitting them to challenge the state's denial of
AFDC benefits for their unborn children because they possessed a
"personal stake in the outcome of the controversy."' 128 The court
specifically refused to reach the question of the plaintiffs' standing
to sue as representatives of their unborn children. It was
then observed that because the pregnant women themselves had
standing to challenge the state's practice, the case was not inconsist-
ent with the Wade decision. Further, the court continued:
[T]his would be so even if the present action does establish stand-
ing for unborn children, for even if Roe v. Wade holds that an un-
born child is not a "person" for constitutional purposes, we deal
here with a legislative enactment.129
The distinction drawn by the Carver court between the constitu-
tional question raised in Wade and the interpretation of a legislative
enactment made in its own case fails to confront the issue. While
the court's observation is accurate, no attempt was made to delineate
and resolve the competing policy considerations which present
themselves in cases involving a woman's right to privacy in an abor-
tion on one hand and AFDC benefits for the unborn on the other.
It may be that the AFDC decisions and Roe v. Wade will have
to be allowed to stand side by side in their inconsistency. This oc-
currence is not altogether uncommon in the law, particularly in
those areas involving the unborn. 30 It does, however, present a
126. Id. at 162.
127. 369 F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973), af'd, 43 U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July
18, 1974).
128. Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 210 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd, 43
U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July 18, 1974), citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962).
129. Carver v. Hooker, 369 F. Supp. 204, 210 n.23 (D.N.H. 1973), aff'd, 43
U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July 18, 1974), citing Alcala v. Burns, 362 F.
Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973), afFd, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974).
130. See, e.g., Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147 at 1154 (N.D. Ill. 1973),
affd, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th Cir. May 9, 1974), for a discussion of the
differing treatments of unborn children for the purpose of inheritance,
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dilemma which has not been adequately resolved by those courts
which have rendered the AFDC decisions.
IV. RESOLUTION
It is evident that in the area of AFDC benefits for the unborn,
a means of finally determining the questions presented in these
cases is needed. One solution would be a Supreme Court ruling re-
solving the division of authority which now exists as a result of the
federal circuit and district court decisions.131 Two cases have now
reached the Supreme Court,132 and it appears likely that the court
will hold that the inclusion of the unborn in the AFDC program is
mandatory and not optional. The existing statute's language, 33
while not explicit, seems broad enough to include the unborn. And
clearly there is no evidence of a specific congressional intent to ex-
clude the unborn. The King-Townsend-Carleson test'3 4 would thus
appear to require that AFDC be granted to the unborn.
Whatever action the Supreme Court takes in this area, Congress
should clarify the language of section 606 (a). The phrase "depend-
ent child" neither clearly excludes nor includes the unborn, 35 and
Congress ought to make known its intention concerning AFDC bene-
fits for the unborn. The rejection by the Ninety-Second Congress of
an amendment specifically excluding the unborn from the pro-
federal taxation, abortion, or actions to recover for wrongful death or
prenatal injuries. See also Note, The Law and the Unborn Child: The
Legal and Logical Inconsistencies, 46 NomE D~avE LAW. 349 (1971).
131. Carver v. Hooker, 43 U.S.L.W. 2057 (1st Cir. July 18, 1974), aff'g 369
F. Supp. 204 (D.N.H. 1973); Wilson v. Weaver, 42 U.S.L.W. 2634 (7th
Cir. May 9, 1974), aff'g 358 F. Supp. 1147 (N.D. Ill. 1973) and Green
v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ind. 1973); Alcala v. Burns, 494
F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974), aff'g 362 F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Doe
v. Lukhard, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), aff'g 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D.
Va. 1973); Taylor v. Hill, No. C-74-101 (W.D.N.C. June 10, 1974);
Mixon v. Keller, 372 F. Supp. (M.D. Fla. 1974); Wisdom v. Norton,
372 F. Supp. 1190 (D. Conn. 1974); Poole v. Endsley, 371 F. Supp. 1379
(N.D. Fla. 1974); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1973);
Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Harris v. Missis-
sippi State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 363 F. Supp. 1293 (N.D. Miss. 1973);
Murrow v. Clifford, Civ. No. 114-73 (D.N.J. June 12, 1974); Parks v.
Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
132. Lukhard v. Doe, petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. May
24, 1974) (No. 73-1763); Burns v. Alcala, petition for cert. filed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3683 (U.S. May 15, 1974) (No. 73-1708).
133. See note 53 supra.
134. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
135. As has been observed, "the 'plain language' of the statute is ... not
conclusive," Alcala v. Burns, 362 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D. Iowa 1973),
aff'd, 494 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1974).
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gram'36 is hardly significant because the conclusions to be drawn
from the congressional failure to act are varied and unhelpful.137
In addition to the need for a final determination of congressional
intent there exists a need for national guidelines concerning the in-
clusion or exclusion of the unborn in the AFDC program. The eligi-
bility standards for AFDC are to be determined at the federal and
not the state level. Thus, while the amount of individual alloca-
tions varies from state to state, the categories of individuals in-
cluded as AFDC recipients must remain uniform for the entire
country.
It might be argued that because of a particular state's limited re-
sources, the inclusion of the unborn will work a hardship on current
AFDC recipients if their allowances are reduced in order to provide
funds for this new group of recipients. 138 If the unborn are required
by the federal statute to receive AFDC benefits, however, the states
have no choice but to provide them. Of course, as previously noted,
the states have considerable flexibility in allocating their available
resources 3 9 and are free to formulate reasonable standards for the
allocation of their welfare funds.140 Thus, variations in the AFDC
program which take into account differing conditions among the
states are possible, while national uniformity of the scope of indi-
vidual eligibility for AFDC benefits is preserved.
Finally, there is a need for clarification of the AFDC decisions'
effect on Roe v. Wade.' 4' There are competing policy considerations
in this context which must be resolved. The needs of welfare re-
cipients must be balanced against the fundamental right to privacy
of all women inherent in the decision to terminate a pregnancy.
The Roe v. Wade holding need not be harmed by the cases requiring
AFDC for the unborn. Simply because identical entities, in this in-
stance the unborn child, are being considered in the two contexts
does not mean that identical treatment is required. However, a log-
ical inconsistency is raised: a pregnant woman can choose to re-
ceive increased AFDC benefits due to the existence of another being
(the unborn child) or she can choose to terminate the pregnancy,
136. Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1329.
137. See the previous discussion of this situation in Part II, supra.
138. In fact, this contention has been made by defendants in certain of these
cases. It is discussed in some detail in Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp.
620 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
139. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Parks v. Harden, 354
F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
140. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Jefferson v. Hackney,
406 U.S. 535 (1972).
141. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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particularly in its earlier stages, because the unborn child does not
exist as a "person" within the protection of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
In its discussion of the abortion issue in Roe v. Wade, the Su-
preme Court may have responded, albeit indirectly, to any difficul-
ties raised by the potential conflict between that case and the AFDC
decisions. In answering the assertion that abortion should be pro-
hibited because the fetus is a "person" from the moment of concep-
tion, the court noted:
In areas other than criminal abortion the law has been reluctant
to endorse any theory that life, as we recognize it, begins before
live birth or to accord legal rights to the unborn except in narrowly
defined situations and except when the rights are contingent upon
live birth.142
A brief discussion of recovery in tort for prenatal injuries, of ac-
tions for wrongful death due to prenatal injuries, and of the un-
born's rights in property and inheritance followed.1 43 The court con-
cluded: "the unborn have never been recognized in the law as
sons in a whole sense."'1 44 It seems entirely likely then, that in
view of the Supreme Court's attitude, the AFDC decisions need not
be regarded as a legal threat to the validity of the Roe v. Wade deci-
sion. Instead it appears that AFDC for the unborn would constitute
one of those "narrowly defined situations' 4 5 in which certain lim-
ited legal rights have been accorded to the unborn.146
V. CONCLUSION
Two of the federal court decisions concerning AFDC for the un-
born are now awaiting final review before the United States Su-
preme Court. 1 47 It seems likely that the Court will determine, on
142. Id. at 161.
143. For a discussion of recovery in tort law for prenatal injuries, see W.
PROssFR HANBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS, § 55 (4th ed. 1971); 2 F.
HARPER and F. JAmES, THE LAw OF TORTS § 18.3 (1956). With respect
to actions for wrongful death resulting from prenatal injuries, see An-
not., 15 A.L.R.3d 992 (1967). For general remarks on these and other
areas of law relating to the unborn, see Note, The Law and the Unborn
Child, 46 NOTRE DAmE LAw. 349 (1971).
144. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973).
145. Id. at 161.
146. It is also important to draw a clear distinction between the criminal
nature of the abortion statutes being considered in Roe v. Wade and
the civil questions involved in the AFDC decisions.
147. Lukhard v. Doe, petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3699 (U.S. May
24, 1974) (No. 73-1763); Burns v. Alcala, petition for cert. filed, 42
U.S.L.W. 3683 (U.S. May 15, 1974) (No. 73-1708).
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the authority of its past decisions 148 and the wording of the federal
statute,149 that AFDC benefits must be given to the unborn and that
the inclusion of the unborn in state welfare programs is not optional,
but mandatory. Congress may then respond to this, or a contrary,
decision by clarifying the language of the statute, specifically in-
cluding or excluding the unborn. This clarification would be de-
sirable. Practical problems of administration will undoubtedly
arise, but can be resolved.
One solution for eliminating the conflict between Roe v. Wade
and the AFDC for the unborn decisions would be congressional en-
actment of new provisions under the Social Security Act establish-
ing programs to assist in meeting the medical and nutritional needs
of eligible pregnant women, but which would not be funded through
the AFDC program. In this way, the special requirements of indi-
gent pregnant women could be recognized and met, but the women
would be receiving benefits in their own right because of a particu-
lar medical condition, and not because of the status of their fetuses
as other "beings" or "dependent children."
In any event, it will be especially important that those who con-
sider this situation not fall into what has been termed "the fallacy
of the transplanted category."'8 0 That is, they must not assume
that identical categories, in this instance the unborn, require iden-
tical treatment in dissimilar areas of the law in which different
laws and policy considerations must be applied. In particular, those
decisions which grant AFDC benefits to the unborn should not be
used to weaken the Supreme Court's holding in Roe v. Wade.
Patricia J. Winter '75
148. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282(1971); Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
149. See note 53 supra.
150. Hancock, Fallacy of the Transplanted Category, 37 CAN. B. REv. 535
(1959).
